Multiplication of Negative Scenarios: the Approach Public Administrations Could Use at Drafting General Rules by Pečarič, Mirko
149
DOI: 10.17573/cepar.2019.1.08 1.01 Original scientific article
Multiplication of Negative Scenarios: 
the Approach Public Administrations 
Could Use at Drafting General Rules
Mirko Pečarič
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Public Administration, Slovenia
mirko.pecaric@fu.uni-lj.si
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0551-5682
Received: 17. 12. 2018
Accepted: 18. 2. 2019
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses problems that emerge when draft laws are created 
without due regard for the calculus of probability. Although the latter 
should be sine qua non for future legislation, legislators usually do not 
use it despite the legislation’s pro future orientation. The paper, based 
on Hume’s old “is-ought” problem (the impossibility to move from de-
scriptive statements to prescriptive ones) and with the awareness that 
probability will not be used soon, offers a solution for the future legi-
slation in the multiplication of (negative) scenarios, applied to different 
life questions. Despite the more and more “popular use” of regulatory 
impact assessments, smart regulation, probability and risk, public admini-
strations as the major drafters of general legal rules usually do not even 
use the (much simpler) negative approach to gain better insight into pro-
blems, although it is per se the natural way of our thinking. A new view on 
probability through signs that fit into (unwanted, but known in advance) 
scenarios can also provide new answers regarding causality. The latter is 
based on signs, which is what evidence per se really means.
Keywords: apophatic (negative) decision-making, draft legislation and regulation, 
probability
JEL: K40
1 Introduction
Authorities have no “authority” over the natural laws and – as practice shows 
– only moderate over people’s emotions and actions. The understanding of 
(un)related (legal) effects nevertheless became more possible with the first 
publications of empirical data on deviancy by government bodies, when de-
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terminism was subverted by the laws of chance.1 A first step towards better 
understanding of such laws is in recognition that legal rules are always (intui-
tively) weighted (Brest and Krieger, 2010; Dworkin, 1978; Irving John Good, 
1983), balanced and more or less probable (the latter is seen in the evidentiary 
standards like “beyond reasonable doubt, probable cause, sufficient cause, 
necessary cause”). For Cicero, probability (P) was the very guide of life (2008) 
and this ipso facto − and even more than for past cases − holds for each de-
cision that should be applied in the future. The latter comes thus relevant 
also for rule-making that affects a larger number of people than adjudica-
tion. Although as a lawyer Leibniz already understood P as a part of natural 
jurisprudence as degrees of assent, of perfection, of likelihood or the chain 
of evidence (G. W. Leibniz, 1988; G. W. F. von Leibniz, 1996), P somehow by-
passed the later generations of lawyers. There is much literature about re-
sponsive (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995), smart (Gunningham, Grabosky and 
Sinclair, 1998), meta (Chiu, 2015), risk-based (Black, 2012) and other forms of 
regulation, while P is still rarely mentioned (let alone used in the public admin-
istration as the largest governmental drafter of general legal rules), although 
scholars debate about it for more than 45 years (Ayres and Nalebuff, 2015; 
Finkelstein and Fairley, 1970, 1971; Tribe, 1971). There is a large number of 
countries that nowadays address regulatory issues within the impact assess-
ment context (to enhance regulatory legitimacy and accountability) (OECD, 
2009, 2014, 2017), but they should go deeper into the very core of P to have 
better laws, to make decisions with more predictable results.
The paper’s predisposition is that P has not been sufficiently elaborated in 
legal drafting, although it is engraved in the very foundations of decision-
making, in degrees of belief, in indications as inartificial proofs and analogy 
between legal cases and notions (Beecher-Monas, 2007; Brest and Krieger, 
2010; Dwyer, 2008). The basic connection between P and evidence comes 
from the very etymological grounds of “evidence” as “the ground for belief or 
an indication or sign” (‘Evidence | Define Evidence at Dictionary.com’, 2016) 
that ‘tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact’ (Garner, 
2004, p. 595).2 And a sign is recognised as such through the order and con-
nection of ideas (to change the order and connection of things and vice versa) 
(Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, 1974). In P’s core are not complex causations, 
but changing (subjective) perspectives from which signs are recognised as prob-
able evidence, not only in the law, but in all matters. There are no special 
forms of reasoning peculiar to law (Alexander and Sherwin, 2008); lawyers 
engage in the same modes of (intuitive, logical) reasoning as other people do. 
Quality in regulation emanates from behaviour (Ridder, 2007); the common 
thought, tradition, institution, and even reason are repetitive forms of behav-
iour, but the public administrations should not only describe/recognise what 
is happening (there are plenty descriptive models of reality for example the 
1 To believe there were such laws, one needed law-like statistical regularities in large 
populations. How else could a civilisation hooked on universal causality get the idea of some 
alternative kind of law of nature or social behaviour (Hacking, 1990, p. 3)?
2 Probability is simply the appearance of connections, resting on proofs [here = ‘lines of 
thought’] in which no logical connection is seen (G. W. F. von Leibniz, 1996, p. 232).
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Weberian, New Public Management, Neo-Weberian, Governance and Good 
administration model), but to look ahead, in the future, a new approach is 
needed. A next step is to predict what could happen (in a manner of driving 
a car – by looking mainly straight ahead, not backwards). If we paraphrase 
Marx’s saying on philosophers, also decision-makers have mainly ‘interpreted 
the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’ (Marx, 1976, p. 
574). And this stands also in the field of legal probability;3 legislators enact 
laws also without knowing their potential (side) effects (Merton, 1936; Sie-
ber, 1981) or from the standpoint of classical perspectives.
So, how things can be changed in the future from the present standpoint, 
and not only described? If there is a difference between the descriptive and 
prescriptive laws, why is so hard to recognise the natural and complex (de-
scriptive) things cannot be regulated prescriptively (the law can merely more 
or less accommodate to natural things)? The classical regulatory methods – 
that are in their core still in the past centuries4 – are not good enough, be-
cause they do not imitate complex adaptable organisms that can adapt to 
the flexible environment. A personal adaptation is the subjective element of 
recognition to adapt, but also this phase is based on a pre-step connected 
with a way by which information is collected, and also the latter is recognised 
as such through the numerous receptors. And the same could stand for the 
public administrations as regulators. This paper is focused on legal drafting 
that receives too little attention in connection with P, because the laws and 
regulations affect a larger number of people than adjudications, and more 
empirical data is available to form a prior P or base rate on which relevant gen-
eral decisions can be made. One of the major obstacles for a higher level of 
objectivity at general drafting is the apparent logical impossibility of the prin-
ciple of induction to form general statements – known as Hume’s guillotine or 
fact–value gap (Hume, 2009). Findings on the inductive method affect human 
rights and their universal and inalienable nature, so better understanding of 
it is not only sine qua non for understanding of P but also of legislation/regula-
tion. Nobel prizes have been given for works on human bias and fallibility, but 
public servants still mainly prepare draft rules with the help of their common 
3 One of the rare examples of probability is the so-called precautionary principle, in the EU law 
applied in the field of environment (see Article 191(2)). One of the most-known cases from this 
field is the judgment of the Court of First Instance, T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council 
of the European Union [2002]. About the apportionment of the burden of proof, the court 
stated that 'the Community institutions must show, first, that the contested regulation was 
adopted following as thorough a scientific risk assessment as possible, which took account of 
the particular circumstances of the present case, and, second, that they had available, on the 
basis of that assessment, sufficient scientific indications to conclude, on an objective scientific 
basis, that the use of virginiamycin as a growth promoter constituted a risk to human health' 
(para 164). Despite the fact that institutions enjoy a discretion vis-a-vis the pursued objectives 
and appropriate means of action, the level of risk and/or the severity of the impact on human 
health and the probability of possible adverse effects, should still be based on »available 
scientific knowledge« (para 152). But - but what to do when on some (legal) field there is no 
scientific knowledge on probability that would allow predictions (that is legal decisions)? In this 
case public officials should create it themselves, and/or at least understand some basis of P. 
4 A reader could compare a newest statute of his country with the General State Laws for the 
Prussian States (Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten) of 1794, and search for 
differences. 
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sense and/or intuition (of what would be the right thing to do or enact), in a 
way laws were made centuries ago. The paper’s RQ is:
How P can be embedded in legislation and regulation, and how the public admin-
istrations could be more adaptable to changes in environment and be at the same 
time in accordance with public values?
2 The paper’s predispositions
One of the first obstacles to make legislative drafting more efficient is con-
firmation bias, as a deliberate and exclusive search for confirming evidence.5 
This kind of cognitive ease with attention focused only on the personal, visible 
or accessible parts is not only very known − think on Rawls’s veil of ignorance 
(2005) − but it is still blind (that further confirms it as bias) to other individual 
cases that disconfirm them. It is also a negative companion to public and/or 
collective decision making. Because of its prevalence also in legislative draft-
ing (a parliamentarian coalition rarely accepts oppositions arguments), it will 
be further addressed later in the paper. The paper claims more objective 
criteria could be established to draft general laws, because reality does not 
matter for coalitions in Parliaments and happens through things capable to 
act based on numerous (un)intended causes and effects. Decision-makers can 
enact better legislation/regulation if they recognise P (and with this a basic 
unpredictability) as a major player in decision-making; their decisions could 
be − through the insertion of P-procedures as the numerical degrees of be-
lief − more predictable, thorough and more objective. If this is too optimistic, 
decision-makers could at least be aware changes in the flexible environment 
are happening more often than classical legal rules “permit”.
The second obstable is classical causality or the cause-effect relation, al-
though already Carnap in 1966 claimed causality 'is not a thing that causes 
an event, but a process…[in which] certain processes or events cause other 
processes or events' (Carnap, 1966, p. 190). Cziko describes this as circular 
causality, where 'perceptions do not control behaviour. Rather, individuals 
vary their behaviour as necessary to control their perceptions and thereby ob-
tain desired outcomes and avoid unwanted ones' (2000, p. 253). Circular cau-
sality (feedback loops) is one of the main elements of systems theory, and it 
can give different perspective also for legislation by bypassing the »is-ought« 
problem.
An effective application of mathematical P will probably not be used any time 
soon in the practice of legal drafting, so to be fast and pragmatic at the same 
time, a method used in apophatic (negative) theology is proposed for the 
public administrations: decisions about future results could be closer to goals 
5 Although this bias has become better known through the works of Tversky and Kahneman 
(2013; 1974), it is found already in cataphatic theology, in which knowledge of God is obtained 
through defining God with positive statements (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016). This tendency can 
also be found in scholars' papers where authors – if they want to gain a reviewer's attention – 
cite numerous authors at the beginning of their papers that have focussed their efforts on a 
particular problem, while falsifiability is ignorant for them; it is based only on experience.
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when decision-makers know what results they do not want, what is absent in 
the present state of things. Such general decisions cannot be the sharp sword 
of Alexander to cut a hard knot of unpredictability, but they can be sharp 
enough − if (besides the mathematical P) negative exclusion and the signs 
of evidence (which decision-makers possess) are used with P. To reach this 
aim, the problem of legal induction will be described in the next chapter, to 
be able to propose a way of determination of P, i.e. beliefs in legal drafting in 
the fourth chapter. In the fifth chapter, a problem of “legal cosmology” will 
be described in order to offer a solution to this problem. The paper’s predis-
positions are the existence of confirmation bias that could be minimised with 
the application of P, within the frame of circular causality. As P will probably 
not be used in the law in a manner used in natural science, a “shortcut” will be 
given in a form of negative thinking.
3 The problem of legal induction in the absence of causality
For Comte ‘the positive point of departure for the work of the statesman …
[is] to discover and institute the practical forms to avoid…crises which spon-
taneous development brings about when it has not been foreseen…in this 
order of phenomena science leads to foresight, and foresight allows us to 
regulate action’ (1998, p. 3). Although this sentence – usually known as savoir 
pour prevoir, prevoir pour pouvoir (to know in order to predict, to predict in 
order to control) “sounds nice”, it jumps to the conclusion because methods 
of knowing and understanding are accepted as relevant also without being 
tested first. As all of them address reality from the inductive or deductive 
point of view, it is valuable to readdress Hume’s is–ought problem.6 Hume 
represents the beginning of the still unfinished conception of science that 
was/is based on the inductive method of research. It is the same as a condi-
tional form of the legal norm (if → then), and is thus important also for legisla-
tors. Kant has tried to avoid Hume’s critique of the principle of causality (phe-
nomena) by declaring pure concepts as a synthetic a priori principles as things 
in themselves (noumena): ‘this complete solution of the Humean problem…
restores to the pure concepts of the understanding their a priori origin…
not, however, in such a way that they are derived from experience, but that 
experience is derived from them, a completely reversed type of connection 
that never occurred to Hume’ (2004, pp. 64–65). Sir Karl Popper agreed with 
Kant we must confront the nature with hypotheses and demand a reply to our 
questions, but Kant’s a priori valid expectation proved too much for him; ‘in 
thinking that these laws are necessarily true, or that we necessarily succeed 
in imposing them upon nature, he was wrong. Nature very often resists quite 
6 For Hume, induction cannot be logically defensible, while causes and effects can be discovered 
by experience (not by reason): ‘even after the observation of the frequent or constant 
conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond 
those of which we have had experience’ (Hume, 2009, p. 228). For him, all reasoning about 
facts originates from the cause-effect relation, although we have no coherent understanding 
of causality: ‘the sense of justice is not founded on our ideas, but on our impressions…[which] 
are not natural to the mind of man, but arise from artifice and human conventions’ (Hume, 
2009, p. 757). 
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successfully, forcing us to discard our laws as refuted; but if we live we may 
try again’ (1962, p. 48).7 Although Popper agreed with Hume’s denial of the 
logical justification of the principle of induction, he was dissatisfied with his 
psychological explanation of induction in terms of custom, because observa-
tions ‘are repetitions only from a certain point of view’ (1962, p. 46).8 Instead 
of explaining our propensity to expect regularities as the result of repetition, 
Popper proposed explaining repetition-for-us as the result of our “propen-
sity to expect” and search for regularities to solve our problems; he invites us 
to provide new hypotheses (expected regularities and/or patterns) through 
which we could evaluate their refutability by real facts that emerge under the 
trial and error principle.
How can legislators/regulators overcome Hume’s guillotine, Kant’s a priori 
principles and Popper’s propensity to expect? Decision-makers many times 
still (only intuitively or also logically) “feel right” i.e. when they use common 
sense and intuition as the prime movers of general rules when they do/en-
act something (Baron, 1998; Kahneman, 2013), but they should also take into 
account possible future »detours« of their acts. One way to bridge a gap be-
tween a legal act and different effects in the future is to consider Wittgen-
stein’s language games: he rejected the (apparent) paradox of following and 
breaking the rule9 by treating action in accord with the rule as its practice: 
‘there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual 
cases…And hence also “obeying a rule” is a practice’ (Wittgenstein, 1986, p. 
81). A connexion between what humans say/read/understand as a rule and 
their actions must thus be regular enough to call it “language”, “institution” 
or “the law”. A rule is thus what its practice shows. Where rules are stated pre-
scriptively (‘woman do not enter rum shops’) much depends on how people 
stand to a rule with which their conduct conforms (MacIntyre, 1978, p. 220). 
Rules' meanings are established with their practical usage.
A next step is a link between future practices and (prescriptive) legislation 
that can be established with imagined practices (scenarios) without using 
causality (the latter cannot be even present in draft laws as they are focused 
in the future). Actions are made/recognised as such in our mental frames, 
where general statements are required by our mind in the form of our inborn 
7 The scientific method depends on considering at the outset the hypothesis that variations 
in the data is completely random and modifying it step by step as data is found to support 
alternatives is a complete reversal of the nature of induction as understood by philosophers 
(Jeffreys, 1998, p. viii).
8 Similarity-for-us is the product of a response involving interpretations (which may be inadequate) 
and anticipations or expectations (which may never be fulfilled). It is therefore impossible 
to explain anticipations or expectations as resulting from many repetitions, as suggested by 
Hume. For even the first repetition-for-us must be based upon similarity-for-us, and therefore 
upon expectations – precisely the kind of thing we wished to explain. This shows that there is 
an infinite regress involved in Hume's psychological theory (K. R. Popper, 1962, p. 45).
9 No course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be 
made out to accord with the rule…if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then 
it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict 
here (Wittgenstein, 1986, p. 81).
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propensity to look for regularities/similarities. This propensity can be a bridge 
between is and ought, if causality is left outside of the is-ought problem. All 
observation involves the recognition of dis/similarities; this recognition, al-
though psychologically and logically a priori, is not valid a priori, for our recog-
nition may fail in new environments, where we often fail to find regularities. 
Order is established ex automata if it is suitable for a relevant legal context. 
Despite the logical impossibility of the principle of induction to climb on a 
ladder of generality, there is our psychological a priori search for regularity. 
A psychological a priori drive or search for regularity to embrace uncertainty 
is not the solution for the “is-ought” problem but it can be the explanation 
for our actions. The mentioned problem can be more objectively addressed 
(but not solved) in the field of P that accepts ought as merely probable based 
on the past data. Hume’s statement was often erroneously understood as a 
statement making no claims about what ought to be a basis of a statement 
about what is. Claims can be made; although they are not valid logically, they 
are “good enough” for the ordinary course of things. If this is not true, legisla-
tors could not enact laws as general rules in which ideas and values have no 
real existence, but exist only as the object of feeling, of values not of reason: 
‘[s]elf-interest is the original motive for the establishment of justice: but sym-
pathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which at-
tends that virtue’ (Hume, 2009, p. 762). Our natural tendency for order could 
on the practical level bypass Hume’s problem; it gives us a foresight that ena-
bles us to regulate our actions. The human inborn tendency for order and the 
search for missing things brought us to the very gates of P, which resembles 
to the doorkeeper’s answer in Kafka’s novel The Trial (2004): “[n]o one else 
could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now 
going to shut it”. The gates are open, and we should step in to grasp P.
4 Probability in the law
In numerous legal works, P is not even mentioned. In some it is, but how it can 
be estimated is not presented (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001; Hudson, 
2003; Palmer, 1998) or it is done very briefly (Dwyer, 2008; Fisher, 2012; Palm-
er, 1998), intended to be applicable for usual legislators or public servants 
as the major drafters of statutes (not being neither experts, nor even begin-
ners). Ordinary logic seems to be inadequate in itself to cope with problems 
involving beliefs (think about a legal promise or future obligation where infer-
ence cannot be made from a particular case to all future cases), so a theory 
of P has been developed. What and how should a decision-maker consider 
different elements to regulate future events? P is a central concept of every-
day decision-making (think about it the next time you cross a street in traffic 
without a traffic light), although maybe due to the principle of legal certainty 
and “predictability” (sic) something that is only probably (although sine qua 
non of each future event) is not very appreciated at legal drafting. We do con-
clusions intuitively (in our lives and mainly also at legal drafting); since we do 
not obtain Ps through statistical methods assumptions can be overestimated. 
In the US, the Supreme Court, in the case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
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ticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993), developed a methodology for these kinds of 
questions. In this case, the Court demanded the trial court not only has the 
power but also the obligation to act as a gatekeeper in determining whether 
an expert’s opinion is based on scientific reasoning10 and methodology. The 
Court gave a non-exclusive list of four factors (that assist to answer a question 
if reasoning or an approach can be scientifically endorsed and used for the 
facts at issue): ‘including whether the theory or technique in question can be 
(and has been) tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and pub-
lication, its known or potential error rate, the existence and maintenance of 
standards controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread 
acceptance within a relevant scientific community’ (at 12−15). It is also of the 
utmost importance for the public servant to know how people’s beliefs and 
evidence are transformed into decisions.
 Judges are not supposed to take previous convictions into account, while 
legal drafters must take the past and present problems into account. It is sur-
prising that P is not used very often in legislation/regulation due to its known 
procedures that help us to think equally in equal situations, i.e. to reduce sub-
jectivity (bias) to a minimum. There is no claim that reasonable beliefs can be 
measured, but relations between them can be calculated.11 P does not con-
cern the merits of the case but the (more objective) regulation of procedure. 
It would be useful if a higher degree of objectivity is present in legal reason-
ing; this is possible when P is used. P was/is a feature of the legal history and 
is still a part of existing legal systems if decision-makers admit this or not. The 
same applies for the distinction between the factual and legal state of af-
fairs. Although each decision maker should be acknowledged with conditional 
probabilities or natural frequencies (Carrier, 2012; Edwards, Jr and Winter-
feldt, 2007; Gigerenzer, 2003; Gigerenzer, Todd and Group, 2000; Hacking, 
2001), we will not go into the details of P here. As was already mentioned in 
the second chapter one method to get closer to predict future actions more 
easily will present P’s very beginning. It lies in the search for consequences, 
although not in the usual way. They can be established by looking for the op-
posites of everything decision-makers know.
5 A problem of “legal cosmology”
As cosmology is the scientific study of the large scale properties of the uni-
verse as a whole, in the same manner legal science naivelly tries to legislate/
10 One of the first decisions where the US Supreme court used social science in support of its 
decision was Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); in this case, the court 
used seven social works from different authors (see note 11 of the decision) to claim that the 
segregation of white and coloured children in public schools has a detrimental effect on the 
coloured children.
11 A probability theory, being a fixed procedure, lends a certain amount of objectivity to 
your subjective beliefs (I. J. Good, 1950, p. 4). The probability you assign to any particular 
proposition is a matter for your own personal judgement, but the set of all your probability 
assignments is subject to fairly strong rules of internal coherence (Hacking, 2006, p. 14).
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regulate society as a whole.12 But as the first uses P in its operations, the sec-
ond lag behind. A problem of »legal cosmology« is hence made by prediction 
without using P.13 A first mistake in decision making is the ignorance of the 
base rate (Ayres and Nalebuff, 2015) which is the most important factor in the 
theory of P: ‘[t]he prior probability, which must always be found before the 
method of pure induction can be usefully employed to support a substantial 
argument, is derived from considerations of analogy’ (Keynes, 1921, p. 276), 
or more vividly ‘telling a jury a likelihood ratio without a prior is akin to telling 
someone how many eggs to include in a cake recipe without telling them how 
much flour to use or the serving size’ (Ayres and Nalebuff, 2015, p. 1500). The 
absence of the base rate is present also in the law when analogy (the other 
name for induction) is used in improper contexts. The base rate is constituted 
by all things decision-makers know but it does not constitute a decision in 
question (although it is very relevant for the latter’s P). Popper assigned the 
utmost importance to this problem with his theory of falsifiability, by which 
‘universal statements are never derivable from singular statements, but can 
be contradicted by singular statements’ (2002, p. 19). Singular observations 
should be used only to falsify possible general solutions, not to deduce any 
particular solution from them.14 Because the positive or the negative anal-
ogy deals with resemblances or differences between objects, for Keynes ‘to 
reduce resemblances between the instances is the same thing as to increase 
the differences between them. Hence any increase in the negative analogy in-
volves a reduction in the comprehensiveness of the characteristics in which 
all the instances resemble one another outside those covered by the gener-
alisation’ (Keynes, 1921, p. 262). The key to reinforce a positive argument is to 
increase known differences between instances: ‘[t]he object of increasing the 
number of instances arises out from the fact that we are nearly always aware 
of some difference between the instances…Every new instance may diminish 
the unessential resemblances between the instances and, by introducing a 
new difference, increase the Negative Analogy. For this reason, and for this 
reason only, new instances are valuable’ (Keynes, 1921, p. 269).
A solution for legal science could be thus also to look for the negative when 
analogy or induction is used. The function of induction is to tell us not which 
predictions are right, but which predictions are indicated as wrong by our 
present knowledge: ‘it is only when our inductive inferences are wrong we 
learn new things about the real world’ (Jaynes, 2003, p. 326). Progress is the 
result of alertness to cases where the inductive method has led to inappropri-
ate likelihoods. People up to a certain point ignore the fact that they did not 
(successfully) predict what would happen (although they later fall into con-
firmation bias with ease) and even amplify unwanted consequences by their 
erroneous thinking. The gist of Carroll’s failure (“if you don’t know where you 
are going, any road will get you there”) can be seen in Ellenberg’s “the missing 
12 This approach is clearly wrong; it results in a more and more growing number of legal acts 
that cause the unintended consequences, administrative barriers, new institutions (without 
reforming the existent ones) etc. 
13 Laws many times enact an obligation for an institution to assess risks (especially in Inspection 
Acts) without even mentioning (a rough frame) how risk could be assessed. 
14 A legal principle stays as the valid principle regardless how many times is violated. 
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bullet holes story”:15 you can only find the weakest spot negatively by search-
ing for missing bullets. People, on the other hand, think similarly, i.e. by exclu-
sion of what they know (to get closer to things they do not know): ‘[t]hinking 
is a putting-aside, rather than a putting-in discipline, e.g., putting aside the 
tall grasses in order to isolate the trail into informative viewability. Thinking 
is frequency modulation for it results in tuning-out of irrelevancies as a result 
of definitive resolution of the exclusively tuned-in or accepted feed-back mes-
sages’ pattern differentiatability’ (Fuller, 1971, p. 121). Scientific systems are 
many times refuted negatively by experienced errors. Solutions are found af-
ter problems have been carefully addressed and ineffective (negative) meth-
ods excluded. The idea per se was known already in apophatic (negative) theol-
ogy, which describes God by negation, that is speaking of God only in terms 
of what He is not (gr. apophanai, “to deny”) rather than presuming to describe 
what God is (Theopedia, 2016).
It is surprising that in this regard (in its apophatic part) also Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding of 1689 was/is still unnoticed in legal deci-
sion-making. To him, liberty cannot be without thought, volition or will, while 
they can (non-freely) exist without liberty. Because liberty presupposes un-
derstanding and will, it cannot belong to the latter. Concerning a man’s liber-
ty, due to this inference, he is occupied with the further question of whether 
a man has free will. In respect of willing, he concludes that a man is not free: 
‘a man in respect of willing – when any action in his power is once proposed to 
his thoughts, as presently to be done – cannot be free [because] it is absolute-
ly necessary that he will be the one or the other’ (1999, p. 230). He concluded 
that will is determined by something outside itself, by uneasiness. Desire, as 
the uneasiness of the mind, determines the will and springs into action: ‘[t]
he greatest positive good determines not the will, but present uneasiness 
alone...the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, 
does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionally to it, makes 
us uneasy in the want of it. Another reason why it is uneasiness alone that 
determines the will, is this: because that alone is present and, it is against the 
nature of things, that what is absent should operate where it is not’ (1999, p. 
238). As he applied the method of exclusivist reasoning to liberty vis-à-vis the 
will and the latter vis-à-vis desire, he also uses it for the power to suspend the 
prosecution of any desire (which makes way for consideration). The mind has 
the power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires. This 
is to him the source of liberty or so-called free will (Locke, 1999, p. 246). His 
reasoning is relevant for our ordinary understanding of legal decision-making, 
although more generally knowable structure of reality gave Spinoza in Ethics 
15 The optimal protection of the U.S. army planes in WWII was about protecting the most 
vulnerable parts. An optimum amount of armour would be at the midpoint between not 
getting planes get shot down by enemy fighters and not making the plane too heavy, less 
manoeuvrable and less fuel efficient. The military wanted – in a common sense manner – to 
put more armour on the parts with the most numerous holes, when Abraham Wald (member 
of a classified statistical research group) asked: “Where are the missing holes”? The missing 
bullet holes were on the missing planes. The reason planes were coming back with fewer hits 
to the engine was that planes that got hit in the engine weren’t coming back. Armour should 
be put on spots with no holes (Ellenberg, 2014).
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with his claim omnis determinatio est negatio (all determination is negation): all 
determination is possible because of positing unreal (finite) things as limita-
tion/separation from the real (infinite) ones: ‘as finite existence involves a par-
tial negation, and infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given 
nature, it follows that every substance is necessarily infinite’ (Descartes et al., 
1974, p. 182). Although Descartes had a similar approach,16 Spinoza’s infinite 
and uninterrupted Absolute was put on a higher level with Hegel’s dialectics 
that involves interruptions in a continuous flow (Hegel is for lawyers known 
mostly with his Philosophy of Right), while an axiomatic mathematical confir-
mation of this “negative reasoning” was given by Kolmogorov.17
The apophatic, negative approach is also a solution to the most famous Wa-
son selection task, the four-card problem in the study of deductive reasoning 
(Wason, 1968). A confirmation through negation is taught in legal schools as 
one of the first legal principles (neminem laedere - do no harm; in medicine it is 
known as primum non nocere - first, do no harm), so it is surprising to note that 
regulators or authorities usually do not use the elimination system of parts that 
are determined not to fit into a particular set. Although Merton popularised 
the notion of unintended (thus also unpredicted) consequences in social sci-
ences (Merton, 1996), such consequences originate from Hume’s “is-ought” 
problem of the (un)predictability of future events. For Taleb, a series of cor-
roborative facts is not necessarily evidence (2010) and to prevent this naïve 
empiricism as Popper intuitively thinks, we can get closer to the truth using 
the negative instances, not by verification: ‘[y]ou know what is wrong with a 
lot more confidence than you know what is right’ (Taleb, 2010). A theory is 
rational or empirical if it can be examined critically either in a direct way (if 
there are already known facts) or by examining/testing its (potentially nega-
tive) consequences. The reasoning here differs from Popper’s, because along 
with a theory’s de facto examination using the new and new hypothesis, we 
can also (only) predict/assume negative consequences without the hypothe-
sis’s examination if there are some predispositions present that allow predic-
tions. There are fields and/or conditions in which prediction can arise based 
on ‘the necessity of scheduling and coordinating our actions…statistical 
regularities…the knowledge of the causal regularities of nature … [and] the 
knowledge of causal regularities in social life’ (MacIntyre, 2007, pp. 102–103).
Legal science has placed too much emphasis on positive results, i.e. what 
the laws, case-law, adjudications and practices are, while their negative sides 
should not be seen only as failures but as a source of valuable information: 
what is not the law, case-law, adjudication and practices is as valuable as their 
positive counterparts: only when grouped together they represent a whole. 
16 I must not imagine that I do not apprehend the infinite by a true idea, but only by the negation 
of the finite (Descartes, Spinoza, & Leibniz, 1974, p. 137).
17 He started the modern axiomatic foundations of probability theory with the first axiom: ृ is 
a field of sets. A system of sets is called a field if the sum, product of and difference between 
two sets of the system also belong to the same system. The set E–A, which is the complement 
of A, is denoted by ~A (~ denotes negative) (Kolmogorov, 1956, p. 2). From A + ~A = E, it follows 
that P(~A ) = 1 – P(A). What we do not know and what we know represents a principle of unity. 
What we do not know can be indirectly assumed through what we know.
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A draft general rule can be tested with increasingly remote consequences in 
the form of negative potentiality: we can more easily imagine negative con-
sequences (what could happen in a black scenario) than what will certainly 
happen. Options are substitutes for knowledge; they give us a possibility to 
choose an option that is ex ante the least harmful or ex post the most benefi-
cial in a light of gained experience (the intelligence effect of trial and error 
in Pasteur’s notion of chance that favours only the prepared mind). Lawyers 
(states) could try to think through the (negative18) consequences of the pro-
posed solutions and/or present decisions based on a certain potency that 
arises due to complexity itself or consequences that increase twice or three 
times of a projected number and in such way obtain predictions and prepare 
future actions. In the future, we could also look through absent things (un/
wanted consequences and/or alternative scenarios) and their magnitudes. If 
we do not know whether something will happen or not, it is better to con-
centrate on those potential consequences that would be most harmful to us. 
From here, we can calculate the P of events and propose relevant measures. 
This could also be called “Black Swan logic”, which makes what you do not 
know far more relevant than what you do know (Taleb, 2010). To solve things, 
we must focus on what we do not know, i.e. to focus on potential harmful ex-
tremes; we can get closer to the truth through negative instances rather than 
by (impossible) verification. We need to administer (absent) consequences.
6 Conclusion
The behaviour of integral aggregate (legal and other) systems cannot be de-
termined with the classical regulatory methods. If the only two alternatives 
or hypotheses regulators admit are good/bad or legal/illegal, the whole rich 
and enormous structure of the living world (and soft law also) is taken out 
as “evidence” on the account of diversity with its numerous possibilities and/
or real processes that work outside the human binary alternatives. Induction, 
analogy and causality can be better embraced if we accept the world of signs 
that transfer to us information about unwanted (but known) consequences. 
A binary stance should be replaced with a colourful scale of weights. Their 
numerical exposition is represented in P, which is present also in a search for 
the negative. The problem of induction can be reduced negatively through 
the reduction of what we know to what we have signs. People can not only 
use their liberty or free will when they consider the problem’s positive and 
negative sides, but they reason more objectively when problems’ elements 
are determined negatively. The more there are, the more the positive side 
can also be determined. The concepts of the mutual independence of two or 
more multiplicative events and additive dependent events are the sine qua 
non for P that from a set of fields (the larger the better) predict future events. 
What is missing in common sense reasoning is precisely all the “missing” signs 
18 In the absence of known consequences, it is easier to imagine what should not happen and the 
first rule is not to do harm to other people – in medicine this is known as Hippocrates’s Primum 
non nocere (“first do no harm”), while the precepts of the Law are to live honestly, not to injure 
another and to give to each one that which belongs to him (“Iuris præcepta sunt hæc: honeste 
vivere, neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere–Institutes, Bk. 1, title 1).
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that disconfirm our prior belief and confirm the same result from different 
perspectives. And the same is true for legislation, because it usually does not 
imitate the adaptable, complex (human) organisms that predict future sce-
narios of what could happen.
As regards RQ − P can be embedded in legislation by posting future (negative) 
scenarios and to them appropriate actions. Legislation can be more adaptable 
to changes in environment and be at the same time in accordance with public 
values through the non-stop feedbacks, (re)organisations and (re)arrange-
ments of elements. In this way control can be constantly (re)acquired over 
new situations that emerge during a change of different conditions or ap-
pear during an implementation of rules – if we know what our goals/scenarios 
are, i.e. what we do not want.19 The “emergent idea of legislaton” is that if 
you want goals, focus on a system in which goals are achieved, i.e. focus on 
processes, their interactions, build the real-time feedback loops and establish 
transparency for all stakeholders and citizens to be able to tell you what they 
do not want. Despite all efforts, final goals can be known today as unwanted 
consequences. On a general (regulatory) level a system is needed in which 
information asymmetries are minimised in a quick manner (this include also 
the moral hazard and human fallibility), and this paper gives the solution: it is 
a system that accommodates/realigns its actions according to detected signs 
that fit into unwanted scenarios.
19 E.g. the plastic and other pollution, alcoholism among young people, fatal accidents, an 
increase of a certain type of disease – what a country should do in the scenario 1 (10% 
increase), scenario 2 (20% increase), scenario 3 (30% increase), etc.? Regardless of taking 
causality outside consideration each country can in the present time determine measures for 
future scenarios; when they come, known measures can be applied without loosing a precious 
time.
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 17, No. 1/2019162
Mirko Pečarič
References
Alexander, L. and Sherwin, E. (2008). Demystifying Legal Reasoning. Cambridge 
University Press.
Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. (1995). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ayres, I. and Nalebuff, B. (2015). The rule of probabilities: a practical approach 
for applying Bayes’ rule to the analysis of DNA evidence. Stanford Law 
Review, 67(6), pp. 1447–1503.
Baron, J. (1998). Judgment Misguided: Intuition and Error in Public Decision 
Making. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beecher-Monas, E. (2007). Evaluating Scientific Evidence: An Interdisciplinary 
Framework for Intellectual Due Process. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Black, J. (2012). The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes. In R. Baldwin, M. Cave 
and M. Lodge, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Regulation. Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 302–348.
Brest, P. and Krieger, L. H. (2010). Problem Solving, Decision Making, and 
Professional Judgment: A Guide for Lawyers and Policymakers. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Carnap, R. (1966). Philosophical Foundation of Physics: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Science. New York: Basic Books.
Carrier, R. (2012). Proving History: Bayes’s Theorem and the Quest for the 
Historical Jesus. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus Books.
Chiu, I. H.-Y. (2015). Regulating (From) the Inside: The Legal Framework for 
Internal Control in Banks and Financial Institutions. Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing.
Cicero. (2008). The Nature of the Gods. (P. G. Walsh, Trans.). Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Comte, A. (1998). Comte: Early Political Writings. (H. S. Jones, Ed.). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Cziko, G. (2000). The Things We Do: Using the Lessons of Bernard and Darwin to 
Understand the What, How, and why of Our Behavior. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Descartes, R., Spinoza, B. de and Leibniz, G. W. V. (1974). The Rationalists: 
Descartes: Discourse on Method & Meditations; Spinoza: Ethics; Leibniz: 
Monadolo gy & Discourse on Metaphysics. New York: Anchor Books.
Dworkin, R. (1978). Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dwyer, D. (2008). The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Edwards, W., Jr, R. F. M., and Winterfeldt, D. von. (2007). Advances in Decision 
Analysis: From Foundations to Applications. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Ellenberg, J. (2014). How Not to Be Wrong: The Power of Mathematical 
Thinking. New York: Penguin USA.
Evidence | Define Evidence at Dictionary.com. (2016). At<http://www.dictionary.
com/browse/evidence?s=t>, accessed 15 March 2016.
Finkelstein, M. O. and Fairley, W. B. (1970). A Bayesian Approach to Identification 
Evidence. Harvard Law Review, 83(3), pp. 489–517.
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 17, No. 1/2019 163
Multiplication of Negative Scenarios: the Approach Public Administrations Could Use at 
Drafting General Rules
Finkelstein, M. O. and Fairley, W. B. (1971). The Continuing Debate over 
Mathematics in the Law of Evidence: A Comment on ‘Trial by Mathematics’. 
Harvard Law Review, 84(8), pp. 1801–1809.
Fisher, G. (2012). Evidence (3 edition). New York: Foundation Press.
Fuller, R. B. (1971). No More Secondhand God. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc.
Garner, B. A. (Ed.) (2004). Black’s Law Dictionary. St. Paul, MN: Thomson West.
Gigerenzer, G. (2003). Reckoning with Risk: Learning to Live with Uncertainty. 
London: Penguin UK.
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M. and Group, A. R. (2000). Simple Heuristics That Make 
Us Smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
Good, I. J. (1950). Probability and the Weighing of Evidence. London: Charles 
Griffin & Co. Limited.
Good, I. J. (1983). Good Thinking: The Foundations of Probability and Its 
Applications. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P. N. and Sinclair, D. (1998). Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hacking, I. (1990). The Taming of Chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Hacking, I. (2001). An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (2006). The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early 
Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference. Cambridge 
University Press.
Hood, C., Rothstein, H. and Baldwin, R. (2001). The Government of Risk: 
Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hudson, B. (2003). Justice in the Risk Society: Challenging and Re-affirming 
‘Justice’ in Late Modernity. SAGE.
Hume, D. (2009). A Treatise of Human Nature. Auckland: The Floating Press.
Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge 
University Press.
Jeffreys, H. (1998). Theory of Probability. Oxford Oxfordshire, New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Kafka, F. (2004). Proces. Ljubljana.
Kahneman, D. (2013). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux.
Kant, I. (2004). Immanuel Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That 
Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science: With Selections from the Critique 
of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keynes, J. M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability. London: MacMillan and Co.
Kolmogorov, A. N. (1956). Foundations of the Theory of Probability. New York: 
Chelsea Publishing Company.
Leibniz, G. W. (1988). Leibniz: Political Writings. Cambridge University Press.
Leibniz, G. W. F. von. (1996). Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding. 
Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (1999). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University.
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 17, No. 1/2019164
Mirko Pečarič
MacIntyre, A. C. (1978). Against the Self-images of the Age: Essays on Ideology 
and Philosophy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
MacIntyre, A. C. (2007). After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Indiana: University 
of Notre Dame Press.
Marx, K. (1976). The German Ideology: Including Theses on Feuerbach and 
Introduction to The Critique of Political Economy. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus 
Books.
Merton, R. K. (1936). The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social 
Action. American Sociological Review, 1(6), 894–904.
Merton, R. K. (1996). On Social Structure and Science. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
OECD. (2009). Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Tool for Policy Coherence. OECD 
Publishing.
OECD. (2014). The Governance of Regulators, OECD Best Practice Principles for 
Regulatory Policy. OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2017). Systems Approaches to Public Sector Challenges: Working with 
Change. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Oxford Dictionaries. (2016). Cataphatic – definition of cataphatic in English from 
the Oxford dictionary. At <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
english/cataphatic>, accessed 2 March 2016.
Palmer, A. (1998). Principles of evidence. Newport: Cavendish Publishing.
Pečarič, M., Jovanović, T., Kozjek, T. and Greif, M. (2015). Objektivnost 
sprejemanja oblastnih odločitev: projekt kategorije A. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za 
upravo.
Popper, K. (2002). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London; New York: 
Routledge.
Popper, K. R. (1962). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific 
Knowledge. New York, London: Basic Books.
Rawls, J. (2005). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press.
Ridder, J. (2007). Factors for legal quality of administrative decision-making. In 
K. J. Graaf, J. H. Jans, A. T. Marseille, and J. Ridder, eds., Quality of Decision-
making in Public Law: Studies in Administrative Decision-making in the 
Netherlands. Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, pp. 31-51.
Sieber, S. (1981). Fatal Remedies: The Ironies of Social Intervention. New York, 
London: Plenum Press.
Taleb, N. N. (2010). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable 
Fragility. New York: Random House Publishing Group.
Theopedia. (2016). Negative theology | Theopedia. At <http://www.theopedia.
com/negative-theology>, accessed 2 March 2016.
Tribe, L. H. (1971). Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process. Harvard Law Review, 84(6), pp. 1329–1393.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases. Science, 185(4157), pp. 1124–1131.
Wason, P. C. (1968). Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 20(3), pp. 273–281.
Wittgenstein, L. (1986). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
